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Introduction
The network of interactions among socio-economic agents may play an important role for the stability and efficiency of socio-economic systems and a such, it is essential to have theories about how such interaction structures form. Indeed many authors have examined the evolution of interaction in different economic contests. A very common characteristic of networks is the presence of decay, which is the value an individual receives from another as a decreasing function of their distance in the network. Decay could be considered as the effect of generic frictions in the relations among agents, for example noise or delay, which are inevitable in the real world.
Generally, network models consider decay as an exogenous characteristic; but we note that in the real word there are many examples where the level of decay depends on some action, decision or behavior of the agents implied in the network. For example, the rate of decay in a communication network could depend on the quality of the device (or technology) used by each agent or by the level of the supplied individual effort. So, in a first step toward reality, we propose a first model of network formation where the rate of decay is endogenously determined by some action chosen by each agent. By the introduction of endogenous decay, the model becomes very complicated and it is very difficult both to provide a complete description of all possible Nash equilibria and to analyze the process of network formation. But using the assumption that agents make mistakes, we provide an almost full description of stochastically stable states without the need to know all possible equilibrium states when agents do not make errors.
We consider the two-way flow network with decay described in Bala and Goyal [1] . They consider a setting in which agents unilaterally 3 form (costly) links in order to access the benefits generated by other agents. These benefits flow in both directions, irrespective of who bears the cost of the link. The benefit that two agents derive from a link depends on the associated level of decay.
Their main evidence is that equilibrium network architectures strictly depend on the relation among decay and link cost. Differently from Bala and Goyal [1] we assume that the rate of decay in the network is endogenous: in a given link the rate of decay depends on the results of a social game between the two (directly) linked agents. There are two possible actions: the first one (the efficient action) produces a zero decay if both agents choose it and a maximum decay if the opponent chooses the other action; the second one (the risk dominant action) produces an intermediate value of decay indifferently from the partner's choice. In this way we model a trade off between complexity (efficiency) and compatibility (risk dominance). 4 In this way the network structure depends on the set of actions chosen by the agents through the (so determined) level of decay. A first result is that, provided the cost of link formation is not too high, the system converges in states characterized by connected networks and in which agents are coordinated on the same action. When the link's cost is high the system could converge either in states characterized by an empty network or in states with a connected network and in which agents coordinate on the risk dominant action.
Moreover, even though we are not able to provide a full description of all equilibrium states the system could converge to, we are able to describe, for a sufficiently large number of agents, stochastically stable states. We find that, for relatively low link cost, the force driving the equilibrium selection in the long run is a trade off between efficiency and risk dominance in the social game. Indeed, stochastically stable states are characterized by agents coordinated on the efficient action if the decay's difference between efficient and risk dominant actions is large enough, otherwise stochastically stable states are characterized by agents coordinated on the risk dominant action. For high cost of link formation, stochastically stable states are characterized either by empty networks or by agents coordinated on the risk dominant action.
Network formation in the presence of decay is studied by, among others, Hojman and Szeidl [12] , Watts [25] and Feri [7] . Hojman and Szeidl study a network similar to the two-way flow model with decay described in Bala and Goyal [1] , with the difference that agents have concave benefits from connections and decay is modeled in a more general way. Watts considers the dynamics of network formation in the case of the connection model of Jackson and Wolinsky [17] and shows that the resulting network structures are path-dependent. However, this second approach differs significantly from the first one mainly because it restricts attention to network models where the consent of both agents is necessary to form a link 5 . Feri [7] is the most related paper; it considers the two-way flow network with decay described in Bala and Goyal [1] and finds a suitable way to characterize stochastically stable states even in the absence of a full characterization of the equilibria the dynamic process could converge to. Applying this technique we are able to analyze a very complex environment characterized by endogenous decay and endogenous networks.
A common result of the above papers is that, given the link cost, the equilibrium architectures strictly depend on the level of decay. However these papers, differently from the present one, study settings where the level of decay is exogenously determined.
Strictly related papers are also those of Goyal and Vega-Redondo [10] , Hojman and Szeidl [13] , Jackson and Watts [15] . Indeed these papers study the interaction between link formation and action choice in a social game. Goyal and Vega-Redondo [10] use a framework where link formation is one side, links are two way-flow and agents interact only with direct neighbors. They find that when the cost of link formation is below a certain threshold then agents coordinate on the risk dominant action, while if the cost is above this threshold agents coordinate on the efficient action. As in our model the social game is played only among directly linked agents but its result affects only the two implied agents. Hojman and Szeidl [13] study a setting where agents interact with direct and indirect neighbours and links are one way flow. They find that long-run equilibrium depends on a trade off between efficiency and risk dominance in the social game. Jackson and Watts [15] study a setting where the consent of both agents is necessary to form a link. Differently from our paper, in these models all equilibrium states, in which network is not empty, are characterized by network architectures that do not depend on which action agents coordinate. This difference is due to the fact that while in these approaches agents establish links to play a coordination game, in our model agents form links to obtain some benefit from other agents and play a coordination game to determine the quality of these benefits; so the result of a single game, determining the decay level in a link, affects the payoff of all agents that use that link in their indirect connections 6 .
The paper is organized in the following way: In section 2 we describe the model. Section 3 contains the main result. Section 4 concludes the discussion and provides possible directions for further research.
The Model

Networks
be a set of agents where 3 n ≥ . Each agent can obtain some benefit when he is directly or indirectly linked with other agents. Benefits can derive from the transmission of private information held by agents. Although other interpretations are possible we focus on information transmission for simplicity. 7 Without loss of generality, in the following we assume that every agent is endowed with one unit of private information of value 1 as well as of a quantity of information derived from other agents in the network.
Each agent can choose a subset of other agents with whom to establish links. Let ( ) 6 and not only the payoffs of the implied agents. 7 See Bala and Goyal [1], they use the example of gains from information sharing as source of benefits.
. We say agent i forms a link with agent j if 1 ij g = . The set of all agents' link decisions,
, defines a directed graph called network. With abuse of notation the network will be denoted by g and the set of all possible networks will be denoted by G. Specifically,
has the set of agents N as its set of vertices while its set of directed edges, N N Γ ⊆ × , is defined as follows:
Given a network g, we say that 2 agents are directly linked if at least one of them has established a link with the other one, i.e. 
{ }
These payoff expressions allows us to particularize the standard notion of Nash equilibrium. On the other hand a Nash equilibrium will be called strict if every agent gets a strictly higher payoff with her current strategy than she would with any other strategy.
Dynamics
Time is modelled discretely, and denoted by 1, 2,3,.... t = At each t, the state of the system is given by strategy profile ( ) ( ) ( )
At every period t one agent is randomly chosen to revise her strategy. When an agent receives this opportunity, she selects a best response to strategy profile in the previous periods:
If there are several best responses, then any one of them is chosen with equal probability. This strategy revision process defines a Markov chain on 1 2 ... n S S S S ≡ × × × . In the following we denote this process by unperturbed dynamics or selection mechanism.
A no empty set of states A S ⊆ is called absorbing if it is a minimal set with respect to the property of being closed under the selection mechanism; hence there is zero probability to transit from a state s A ∈ to another state ' \ s S A ∈ . 9 So the possible states the selection mechanism will converge are described by the states contained in absorbing sets . In the following we denote by S the set of all states belonging to absorbing sets and by S the set of absorbing sets. As we will see, in our framework, this Markov chain could be characterized by several absorbing sets; in that case which states the selection mechanism will converge, depends upon the initial conditions which in turn motivates the following equilibrium selection.
To select among all possible absorbing sets, we employ the standard techniques used by Kandory, Mailath and Rob [19] and Young [26] . We suppose, conditional on the chance to revise her strategy, agents make mistakes (or mutations). In this case, agent chooses her strategy at random with some small probability 0 ε > . For any 
Results
In this section we characterize the efficient states, study the characteristics of static equilibria, and analyze the dynamics.
Efficiency
We use the utilitarian concept of efficiency: the efficient state is that producing the higher total net payoff (gross payoff less cost of links). δ α α < , we could restrict the set of efficient networks because the share of information arriving from an agent to another is decreasing with the number of links that has to pass through. In accordance with Proposition 1 in Jackson and Wolinsky [17] , we find that the efficient networks are either complete or stars or empty depending on the link cost k.
Static equilibria.
Our first result concerns the nature of states that arise in equilibrium. In this setting we have a multiplicity of Nash equilibria, such as, among others, states characterized by agents choosing different actions. A Nash equilibrium in which some agent has multiple best responses is likely to be unstable since this agent can decide to switch to another payoff-equivalent strategy. This motivates an examination of strict Nash equlibria that are described in the following proposition.
strict Nash equilibrium. Then g is essential, connected and
The Proposition describes two important features of strict Nash equilibria: aggregation and conformity. A state characterized by a network with two or more separated components is not a strict Nash equilibrium because always some agent prefers to supports links with no connected agents. The special case of a state characterized by empty network cannot be strict because, even if the incentives to form links are not enough, agents indifferently choose an action or another. A state with agents coordinated on different actions cannot be strict because β -agents are indifferent on which α -agent to be linked. Finally we note that only for 1 k < efficient states are strict Nash equilibria. Indeed, in this range of link cost, states where all agents are coordinated on efficient action could be strict Nash equilibria as well as states where all agents are coordinated on the riskdominant one; in the first case the proposition says that the network has to be a center-sponsored star; for 1 k > only states where all agents are coordinated on the risk-dominant action can be strict Nash.
Proof. The proof goes in two steps. In the first one we prove that in all strict Nash equilibria where . If an agent switches to action α , she obtains a zero payoff. Then the considered state is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Step 2. Consider any strategy profile where n α agents are choosing action α , n β agents are choosing action β and 1 n α > . 10 Using the same arguments as in Proposition 4.2 in Bala and Goyal [1] we know that, if k<1, in a strict Nash equilibrium all α -agents have to link among themselves in a cs g . Suppose that β -agents are in one or more separated components. This state cannot be a strict Nash equilibrium because any β -agent, forming a link with an α -agent, could obtain an additional payoff of n e k α ⋅ − that is strictly positive. All connected states where α -agents support links with β -agents cannot be strict Nash equilibrium because α -agents obtain a negative net payoff from their links with β -agents 11 . Finally, all connected states where β -agents support links with α -agents cannot be strict Nash equilibrium because β -agents are indifferent on which α -agent to be tied. In the case for 1 k ≥ , in a strict Nash equilibrium all agents must be β -agents because a strict Nash equilibrium for α -agents does not exist. QED.
Dynamics
In this section we describe the dynamic properties of different equilibria. First we describe the characteristics of states where the selection mechanism will converge. Then we provide an almost complete description of stochastically stable states.
The following proposition give us a description of the states belonging to absorbing sets.
Proposition 3:
10 The special case with 1 n α = cannot be a strict Nash equilibrium because the unique α -agent obtains zero payoff:
she could change action obtaining at least a zero payoff (for example, if she changes action and does not link with anyone, she obtains zero payoff).
11 an α -agent supporting one link with a β -agent obtains a negative payoff of -k. Proof. To show that only states described in the proposition can belong to absorbing sets it is enough to prove that under the selection mechanism: a) from any s S ∈ there is a strictly positive probability to go in one state described in the proposition; b) there is zero probability to move from the states described in proposition to states that are not. We need the following lemmas. 
II) Let
The proof is in the appendix. We note that it is impossible to satisfy both conditions (3.1) and (3.2); indeed the right part of (3.1)
is larger that right part of (3.2) for any value 1 x ≥ . It follows that at most one of these two conditions can be satisfied. Suppose the first one is not satisfied; if given the chance to revise, α-agents switch to action β; suppose that (3.2) is not satisfied; if given the chance to revise β-agents switch to action α. Then, by a strictly positive probability, the selection mechanism goes in a state where , i j a a i j N = ∀ ∈ . The results described in Lemma 1 and 2 are enough to complete the proof of the convergence to states described in the proposition. Finally we show there is zero probability to move from the states described in part I of the proposition to states that are not. characterized by an unique and connected β -group, with each β -agent supporting one link to the unique and minimally connected α-group. Given that β -agents are indifferent on which α-agent to 12 Given that agent j is receiving all links that β-agents support to the α-group, the be linked, there exists a positive probability that dynamic process goes in a state where all β -agents are linked to the same α-agent. The condition such that an α -agent, receiving links from all β -agents, does not switch action is equal to (3.1). Moreover consider the condition (3.3) such that a β -agent does not switch to action α ; the less strict condition is for ( , ) ( For any interval of link cost the proposition describes more than one absorbing set. When 1 k < we can partition states belonging to absorbing sets into those in which agents coordinate on action α and those in which agents coordinate on action β ; if 1 k > we can divide states with agents coordinated on action β from those characterized by empty network (without interaction between agents). 13 We note that emerging network structures depend on the action on which agents are coordinated. So, given the multiplicity of absorbing sets, the final outcome of the dynamic process depends on initial conditions. Natural questions are about the most probable states to emerge in this process or which are the most "robust" states to perturbations, inevitable in the real word. But to answer these questions a complication is that we are not able to produce a full description of states belonging to absorbing sets in the interval ( )
2 e e k e n e − < < + − ⋅ . In spite of all that, we provide an almost complete description of a special subset of absorbing sets using the concept of stochastic stability. To do this selection the result stated in proposition 3 is important because it delimits the 13 Moreover, among the states described in the proposition we can identify some important class of states. set of states that can potentially be stochastically stable since every such state must be a limit point for the unperturbed dynamics. The following theorem summarizes our analysis. To prove this Theorem we use the notion of recurrent set in the sense of Definition 7.4 in Samuelson [22] : a recurrent set ⊆ X s S is a collection of absorbing sets with the following two properties: a) it is impossible starting from an absorbing set A∈ X , to end up in an absorbing set ' A ∉ X , by means of a single perturbation followed by the selection mechanism; b) given two absorbing sets ', "
A A ∈ X , we can find a sequence of absorbing sets in X , 1 The proof is in the appendix.
To prove that all s S β ∈ are in the same recurrent set is sufficient to check property (b) of recurrent sets. The proof is very similar to that of part I of Theorem I in Feri [7] and it is omitted 14 . To prove that all s S α ∈ are in the same recurrent set the result in lemma 3, satisfying property (b) of recurrent sets, is sufficient: assume that S α is split into two or more subsets and each subset is contained in a separate recurrent set. The result stated in Lemma 3 is in contradiction with property (a) of recurrent sets. Therefore only S α and S β are candidates to be recurrent sets. The result stated in part a of Lemma 4 is enough to prove that, for n sufficiently large, S α and S β are two separate recurrent sets. Indeed this result says us that both S α and S β satisfy property (a) for recurrent sets.
Given that only states in S α and S β are candidates to be stochastically stable we have to compute the stochastic potential only for them. It is directly verifiable that A-trees for any absorbing set The proof is in the appendix.
By the result stated in proposition 3 we identify two candidates to be recurrent sets: set. The proof of this statement goes in two steps. In the first we note that a recurrent set 14 To use the proof in part I of Theorem I in Feri [7] is sufficient to assume mutations in which agents change only the link strategy and continue to use action β . 15 Lemma 1 in Feri [7] can be modified in the following way: Let it is sufficient to have one mutation followed by unperturbed dynamic. The proof of this statement is very similar to that in Feri [7] : it is sufficient to assume an initial mutation in which the "mutant" agent changes only the link strategy and continue to use action β . Given that for all agents to change action is not a best response because produces a zero payoff , it is directly verifiable that the proof is the same. 16 Lemma 2 in Feri [7] can be modified in the following way: Let The proof of this statement is very similar to that in Feri [7] : it is sufficient to assume mutations in which agents change only the link strategy and continue to use action β .
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The proof is in the appendix.
The results in part a of Lemma 6 is enough to prove that, for n large enough, S α and S β are two separate recurrent sets. Indeed this result says us that both S α and S β satisfy property (a) for recurrent sets. Given that only states state s S α ∈ it is sufficient one mutation followed by unperturbed dynamics.
Lemma 8:
Let 1 e k < < . From any s S α ∈ , after a single mutation followed by unperturbed dynamics the system converges to s S α ∈ if 2 e k 1 e n 2 < − − − .
A recurrent set without s S α ∈ cannot exist. To prove this statement Lemma 7 is sufficient: assume there is a recurrent set that does not contain any state s S α ∈ ; a single mutation, followed by an unperturbed dynamics, is sufficient to move the system in a state s S α ∈ . This fact violates property (a) of recurrent sets. By the proof of part I, we know that S α satisfies property (b) of recurrent sets and that all s S α ∈ have to be in the same recurrent set. Therefore there exists only one recurrent set containing all s S α ∈ . If ( ) 2 k 1 e e n 2 < − − − , the unique recurrent set contains only s S α ∈ . To prove this, Lemma 8 is sufficient. Given that only one recurrent set exists, all states belonging to it are stochastically stable (Proposition 7.7 in Samuelson [22] ).
Part IV ( k 1 ≥ ). We need the following lemmas: e e k e e − < < − and k e > . This fact is due to the difficulty to prove Lemma 5 in the interval 2 3 e e k e e − < < − and an equivalent lemma for states s S ∈ such that i a i N β = ∀ ∈ and ps g G ∈ when k e > . 17 We illustrate the stochastically stable states using the following figure, where we display their main characteristics according to the levels of e and k (x-axis displays e and y-axis displays k). We note that there is a trade off between compatibility and efficiency. When the premium 18 to play efficient action (α ) is small, states characterized by coordination on the risk dominant action ( β ) are stochastically stable because they are more robust to perturbations; otherwise stochastically stable states are those characterized by the efficient action. The intuition is that agents choosing action α receive more payoff from other α -agents but receive nothing from β -agents, while β -agents receive payoff from all agents. So when an agent switches from β to α , her payoff increases of at least 1 e − for each α -agent but decreases of e for each β -agent; on the contrary, when an agent switches from α to β , her payoff decreases of at least 1 e − for each α -agent and increases of e for each β -agent. It follows that smaller 1 e − , the more mutations are needed to cause a transition from states characterized by coordination on β action (the risk dominant action) to states in which agents coordinate on action α (the efficient one) and the less mutations are needed for the reverse transition.
Externalities generated by passive links are a second cause that increases robustness of states characterized by coordination on the risk dominant action because they decrease the number of perturbations needed to switch from states with all agents choosing action α to states with all agents choosing action β . The intuition is described in the following example: denote by i a β -agent supporting a link with an α -agent, denoted by j; agent j does not receive any payoff from the passive link, while switching action she will receive an externality of e. That is, passive links from 18 In the single game is 1 e − β -agents generate externalities only to β -agents. So in a first approximation, there is an incentive of e to switch from action α to action β for each passive link from β -agents. Viceversa a passive link from an α -agent generates externalities (of different size) for all kinds of agents, of 1 for α -agents, of e for β -agents. So in a first approximation, there is an incentive of 1 e − to switch from action β to action α for each passive link from α -agents. Given that 0,5 e > passive links generate more incentives to switch from action α to action β that viceversa.
A third effect affecting stochastically stable states is the link cost. Indeed, for any given value of e, efficient states are stochastically stable only for intermediate values of k. The intuition is that,
for small values of k, the advantage to be coordinated on the efficient states, deriving from a smaller number of links, is lower. On the other side for large values of k, coordination problems seem to play an important role to rule out the efficient states.
Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed in a stylized form a social network characterized by an endogenous level of decay that is assumed to depend on the actions chosen by agents participating to the network. Differently from Hojman and Szeidl [13] , Jackson and Watts [15] , Goyal and Vega
Redondo [10] , our model is characterized by equilibrium network architectures that depend on which action agents coordinate.
In this model we have a large number of equilibria and we are not able to produce a full description of them; on the contrary we are able to produce an almost full characterization of the set of stochastically stable states. The main result is that efficient states are stochastically stable for intermediate levels of link cost and if the premium to play efficient action is sufficiently high.
Further development can be made in many directions. First, we might consider a model with two-side link formation: this is more similar to real world and it may change the result on stochastic stability. Second, we might use a setting where small deviations from the best response are more likely that large ones. Third, we can model the endogenous decay using different social games that could be better fit to different empirical situations. 
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Proof of Lemma 1.
Part a ( 1 k < ). In this range of link's cost the best response of any α -agent is to be tied (either directly or indirectly) with all other α -agents in unique α -group because 1 0 k − > . Then after the first agent has revised, the network will be connected. We note that agents have incentive to delete all links that are not necessary to maintain the network connected. Indeed it is directly verifiable that deleting these links the payoff of supporting agents increases of k for each deleted link. Then after all agents have revised, the network will be minimally connected. Finally we note that agents have no incentive to switch to action β because it causes a payoff reduction of 1 e − for each connected agent.
there is a postive probability to go in a state
The proof of this result is omitted because it uses the same arguments than in Theorem 4.1 in Bala and Goyal [1] . We note that agents characterized by a best response to support at least one link and those receiving at least one passive link have no incentive to switch to action β because it causes a payoff reduction of at least 1 e − for each connected (either directly or indirectly) agent. Only no-connected agents could switch to action β . Moreover we note there is no incentive to support links with no-connected agents. These evidences are sufficient to prove that there is zero probability that system converges to a ste characyerized by a coonected network and i a β = for some i N ∈ . QED.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Part a ( 2 k e e < − ). The best response of β -agents is to be directly tied with all other agents because 2 e k e − > ; to change action is not a best response because produces a zero payoff. It is directly verifiable that, after all agents have revised, the network will be a c g G ∈ .
Part b (
2 e e k e − < < ). The best response of β -agents is to be either directly or indirectly tied with all other agents because 0 e k − > ; to change action is not a best response because produces a zero payoff. Therefore it is directly verifiable that, after all agents have revised, the network will be connected.
Part c ( e k 1 < < ). Given any g G ∈ we define the following sets of agents:
Give the chance to revise only to agents i M ∈ . After each revision M decreases or does not change while L increases or does not change. Therefore the dynamic process converges either: a)
in a state where M is empty ( We note that the probability to move from any state s S ∈ such that e g g = to states s S ∈ such that e g g ≠ is zero.
Part e ( ( ) 2 2 k e n e > + − ⋅ ). This proof is based on the observation that the link cost is higher of the maximum payoff obtainable from a single link. QED.
Proof of Lemma 3
Start with a state s' S α ∈ and consider an agent 1 i N ∈ that changes strategy by choosing her corresponding strategy in any s" S α ∈ . s . In this way, we can find a path of one step mutations, which produce the transition between two generic types of s S α ∈ . QED.
Proof of Lemma 4
Denote by
, the number of links that agent i supports to agents choosing action h.
Similarly, h i r stands for the number of passive links received from agents choosing action h.
Step I. Consider the transition from some s S α ∈ to some ' s S β ∈ . Suppose that in any state s S α ∈ x agents switch randomly to some strategy Step II. Consider the transition from some s S β ∈ to some ' s S α ∈ . Suppose that in a state s S β ∈ x agents switch to some strategy ( ) 
Proof of Lemma 5
Consider any s S ∈ such that i a i N β = ∀ ∈ and s g G ∈ . Suppose a mutation in which an agent changes link strategy but does not switch action. We note that in this case no agent has incentive to switch action; indeed, using action β any agent obtains a strictly positive payoff from any link strategy; on the contrary, switching to action α any agent obtains a zero payoff. Therefore for this kind of mutation the proof is equal to that of Lemma 3 in Feri [7] and it is omitted. Now consider a mutation where the "mutant" agent changes both link strategy and action. We have to prove the have no incentive to change strategy. Therefore, when agent m receives the chance to revise she switches to her ante-mutation strategy and the state goes back to the initial one. QED.
Proof of Lemma 6
Let Step I. Consider the transition from any s S α ∈ to any ' s S β ∈ . Suppose that in any s S α ∈ x agents switch randomly to some strategy ( ) Therefore it is directly verifiable that giving the chance to revise to all agent / j N M βα ∈ the system converges to a state s S α ∈ such that c g G ∈ . From (A.15) it is directly verifiable that 2 m αβ ≥ if n is large enough.
Step e 2 e e 1 k 2 e 1 + ⋅ − − < ⋅ − and n is sufficiently large. QED.
Proof of Lemma 7
Consider any state s S ∈ such that When agent m has the chance to revise, she will sever all supported links and the state will be characterized by e g g = and i a i N β = ∀ ∈ . We note that in this state any revising agent is indifferent to chose an action or another because she obtains, in any case, a payoff equal to zero.
Then, when an agent receives the chance to revise, he will choose the action randomly. After a first agent has switched to action α , the best response of all other agents will be to switch to action α and to support one (new) link with any α -agents. Then giving the chance to revise to all agents the state will go in any s S α ∈ . QED.
Proof of Lemma 8
This results is strictly related to Lemma 6. When m 1 αβ > (one mutation is not enough to cause a transition from any s S α ∈ to s S α ∉ ), using equation (A.12), we obtain have the chance to 22 The necessary condition for 1 m αβ > is 2 1 k e < − ; it is always satisfied for all 2 3 e 2 e e 1 k 2 e 1 + ⋅ − − > ⋅ − such that 2 e e k e − < < . revise, they delete all supported links (note that they do not change action because any agent, switching action, obtains a payoff equal to zero, while choosing β obtains a strictly positive payoff). After all agents / i N m ∈ have revised, the state will be characterized by a cs g G ∈ with agent m at the center. In this state agent m obtains a strictly negative payoff equal to ( 1) ( ) n e k − ⋅ − .
When agent m has the chance to revise, she will sever all supported links and the state will be characterized by e g g = and i a i N β = ∀ ∈ . In this state the best response of any agent is not to support any link, because she could receive only a strictly negative payoff. QED.
Proof of Lemma 10
Consider any state s S ∈ such that Therefore if (1.18) is not satisfied one mutation is not enough to transit in an absorbing state different from the initial one. QED.
